

# Evaluating Urban Planning: Evidence from Dar es Salaam

Vernon Henderson (LSE)

Francisco Libano-Monteiro (LSE)

Martina Manara (Sheffield)

Guy Michaels (LSE)

Tanner Regan (GWU)

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## Challenge: urban planning in LMICs

- ▶ Cities in HICs: urban planning plays central role
  - ▶ Public use (esp. roads) 40-50% of developed land; private land zoned or regulated

## Challenge: urban planning in LMICs

- ▶ Cities in HICs: urban planning plays central role
  - ▶ Public use (esp. roads) 40-50% of developed land; private land zoned or regulated
- ▶ Cities in LIC/LMICs: planning often absent or ineffective
  - ▶ Informality may lower private investments and inhibit public service provision
  - ▶ These cities are growing fast and face proliferation of slums

## Response: 'De novo' (greenfield) urban planning

- ▶ 'De novo' urban planning is important policy tool to address informality problem
  - ▶ Purchase cheap agricultural land on urban fringe
  - ▶ Partition into formal plots with minimal services - mostly unpaved roads
  - ▶ People buy plots and build their own homes
- ▶ World Bank financed such 'Sites & Services' in many countries (1970s & 80s)
  - ▶ Policy stopped in 80s: low repayment rates and exclusion of poorest
  - ▶ But cost effective in long-run: raises land values, attracts private investment, prevents deterioration of public services (Michaels et al. 2021, Owens et al. 2018).
  - ▶ Recently, some African governments picked it up (e.g. [Ethiopia](#), [Rwanda](#), [Tanzania](#))
- ▶ So, de novo planning important for urban development, but:
  - ▶ Scant evidence on **how best to do it!**

This paper: '20k' projects in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania ~2000-2005

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How do planning choices within neighbourhoods affect outcomes?

- ▶ Planning choices:
  - ▶ Residential: size of own plot and neighbouring plots
  - ▶ Non-residential: planned public and commercial uses, local access roads
- ▶ Outcomes:
  - ▶ Bare-land transaction values
  - ▶ Housing investment and timing (developed or not by ~2020)
  - ▶ Educational attainment (landowning residents)

## 20k areas in Dar es Salaam

- ▶ thin lines: 20k areas (labelled)
- ▶ bold lines: pre-existing major paved roads
- ▶ dashed lines: city edge







June 2001

Greenfield Site, land is parcelled and sold



May 2021

# 20 years on, owners develop plots themselves

## Descriptive: prices in and outside of 20K areas


$$\ln \text{price}_{p,t} = \beta \ln \text{size}_p + \gamma \text{Non20kS}_p + \delta \text{Non20kU}_p + \eta_t + \mu_{l(p)} + \varepsilon_{p,t}$$

Note: plot  $p$  sold at time period  $t$  in neighborhood  $l(p)$

	(1)	(2)
	Ln Price	Ln Price
Ln plot size	0.71 (0.054)	0.69 (0.041)
Non-20K Surveyed	-0.23 (0.16)	-0.27 (0.12)
Non-20K Unsurveyed	-0.70 (0.099)	-0.71 (0.079)
Mean Outcome	17	17
20K or Nearest FE		✓
N	2074	2074


- ▶ 20k +100% vs informal blue
  - ▶ 31% town planning red
  - ▶ 69% property rights (title and boundaries) blue - red

# Example: plots of different sizes in Tuangoma with insula and superinsula




## Finding 1: price of land (per sqm) falls with plot size

$$\ln \text{price/sqm}_{p(i),t} = \sum_b \beta_b I(\text{size}_{p(i)} \in b) + \eta_t + \mu_{l(i)} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$




## Spatial RD: at same location, large plots valued less

insula pairs with gap size  $\geq 400\text{sqm}$



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Price per square metre difference suggests misallocation, back-of-envelope:


**split one 1600sqm (US\$16.7k) into four 400sqm plots (US\$6.4k) → gains (US\$7.8k, or ~47%)**

accounts for per plot costs at time of planning (US\$375)

but nowadays splitting plots is difficult (legal and procedural barriers)

## Finding 2: small plots are much more densely developed by 2020


$$\text{Share Built}_i = \sum_b \beta_b \mathbf{1}(\text{size}_i \in b) + \mu_{l(i)} + \varepsilon_i$$





but, large plots similarly built-upon by 2020

$$\text{Plot is Built}_i = \sum_b \beta_b \mathbb{1}(\text{size}_i \in b) + \mu_{l(i)} + \varepsilon_i$$



## Small plots provide more housing and have higher population density

	Mean pop. per built res. plot	Share of Plots Built	Mean plot size (sqm)	Pop. dens residential (ppl/sqkm)
Small Plots ( $\leq 800$ sqm)	5.3	0.50	629	4166
Medium Plots (800-1600sqm)	5.4	0.49	1179	2232
Large Plots ( $\geq 1600$ sqm)	5.6	0.49	1961	1392
All Plots	5.4	0.49	1040	2552

### Finding 3: small plots have positive externality on built development


$$y_i = \beta L_{SI(i)} + \delta_0 \text{dist}_i * L_{SI(i)} + \delta_1 \text{dist}_i * (1 - L)_{SI(i)} + \mu_{SP(i)} + \mathbf{x}'_i \gamma + \varepsilon_i$$

Note: cell  $i$  in super-insula  $SI$ , paired  $SP$ , with  $i$ 's nearest other super-insula.

- ▶ Super-insula:
  - ▶ contiguous S, M, or L insula
- ▶ Moving 'deeper' into small-plot area:
  - ▶ More dense development
  - ▶ More likely plot is built upon
- ▶ Deeper into large plots not much

	(1)	(2)
	Share gridcell built	Plot is built
Own Larger	-0.0013 (0.0026)	-0.00053 (0.011)
Own Smaller × Dist. (km)	0.053 (0.017)	0.21 (0.066)
Own Larger × Dist. (km)	-0.029 (0.018)	0.030 (0.070)
Ln plot size	-0.066 (0.0032)	0.026 (0.013)
Mean Outcome	0.11	0.49
N (gridcells)	92753	92753
N (plots)	35525	35525

## Finding 4: non-res uses were often **planned** but not **implemented**



## Finding 5: wealthy households sort into project, and within project

- ▶ 20k projects attract relatively wealthy residents
  - ▶ average HoH years schooling
    - ▶ Dar es Salaam: 8.7 years (LSMS Dar es Salaam 2014)
    - ▶ 20k resident: 11.5 years (our survey, N=3230)
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- ▶ Access for poor limited (despite low gov't sale price, ~\$1 per sqm) because:
  - ▶ Minimum plot size (colonial legacy) was large (~400sqm)
    - ▶ only recently lowered to 300sqm nationally ([Kironde 2006](#))
  - ▶ Process of plot sale was rushed to repay internal gov't loan
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    - ▶ Insiders: many gov't employees (?)
- ▶ within project, resident-owners sort onto plots by size
  - ▶ yrs school  $\uparrow$  0.65 for 2x in plot size

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0. The plots sold, covered project cost ( $\sim$ \$1 per sqm)
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  - ▶ Large plots have more open space (share built  $\uparrow 0.01$  for 10% in plot size)
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5. Sorting of wealthy resident-owners into the program (and within)
  - ▶ +4 yrs vs. avg HoH in Dar, and yrs school  $\uparrow 0.65$  for 2x in plot size

# Thank you!

- ▶ Feedback very welcome after the talk or over email
- ▶ Tanner Regan ([tanner\\_regan@gwu.edu](mailto:tanner_regan@gwu.edu))

## Bibliography

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