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Valuing the hidden benefits of forest-based climate change mitigation

5 Summary

6 Forest conservation and restoration continue to be undervalued, underpriced, and
7 underfunded. Financing for forests mostly focuses on climate change mitigation, valuing
8 forests for their carbon storage capacity. With increasing attention on the importance of
9 biodiversity, ecosystem services, and preservation of indigenous and local cultures,
10 however, it has become clear that there are visible and invisible co-benefits of forests that
11 are equally – if not more – significant than carbon alone. As such, we review evidence
12 supporting an expanded valuation of forests, and assess practical examples to overcome
13 this valuation gap. We do this by first offering an economic framework for our analysis,
14 defining a *social cost of deforestation (SCD)*. We then use this lens to assess a suite of
15 opportunities to appropriately value and monetize forest co-benefits. These identified tools
16 may help avoid suboptimal outcomes arising from a carbon-centric approach – supporting
17 policy discussions, and unlocking expanded public and private finance for forests.

18

19 Keywords

20 forests, nature-based solutions, climate change mitigation, co-benefits,
21 ancillary benefits, theoretical framework, monetization, ecosystem services,
22 ecosystem valuation, total value capture
23

24 INTRODUCTION

25 Forests provide enormous ecological, economic, and social value (Fuss et al., 2021; Golub
26 et al., 2018; Kappen et al., 2020). The contributions of forests to society include climate
27 change mitigation, biodiversity protection, provision of ecosystem services, preservation of
28 indigenous culture, and human health impacts (Watson et al., 2018). One estimate puts the
29 total economic value of forests between US\$50 and \$150 trillion, with the upper limit being
30 nearly double the value of global stock markets (Kappen et al., 2020). In addition, forests
31 hold immeasurable intrinsic value for nature and humanity (Dasgupta, 2021). They are an
32 immense natural asset that is essential to the balance of our earth and human systems.

33
34 The climate benefits of forests have received growing attention over the last decade, in both
35 scientific and policy spaces. Forest-based carbon mitigation could play a particularly
36 important role in stabilizing and reducing CO₂ concentrations while the world transitions
37 away from fossil fuels (Harris et al., 2021; Houghton & Nassikas, 2018). Recent studies
38 support the notion that reforestation, avoided deforestation, and improved sustainable forest
39 management are crucial strategic tools to prevent and reverse the worst long-term impacts
40 of climate change (IPCC, 2019). These mitigation pathways are also the most readily
41 available for implementation (Girardin et al., 2021); in particular, forest conservation offers a
42 large percentage of potential mitigation among natural climate solutions (NCS) and is also
43 among the most cost-effective of NCS abatement pathways (Roe et al., 2019). For these
44 reasons, the climate benefits of forests have received growing attention over the last
45 decade, in both scientific and policy spaces.

46
47 Incorporating these benefits into market-based decision making and policy priorities,
48 however, can present a challenge. This is perhaps due to the time lag of these potential
49 climate benefits from the moment of avoided deforestation, when pitted against conflicting
50 priorities with more immediate and concentrated impacts (Lohmann, 2001). Yet these long-
51 term climate benefits are not the only value that forest systems provide. The forest-based
52 climate change mitigation pathways noted above provide biophysical, socioeconomic, and
53 other co-benefits spanning biodiversity, human health, green infrastructure, improved
54 governance, and other benefits yet to be fully articulated (Soto-Navarro et al., 2020). These
55 co-benefits of forest-based climate actions provide a host of more immediate welfare effects,
56 which provide significant additional incentives for decision-makers to deploy them (Ürge-
57 Vorsatz et al., 2014).

58
59 Despite these diverse and enormous benefits, preserving global forests is proving to be one
60 of the greatest challenges of our time, as the international community continues to
61 unsustainably deplete their collective natural assets (Dasgupta, 2021). According to FAO
62 estimates, over the last decade the world lost 13 million hectares per year – an area the size
63 of Greece (FAO, 2020). This trend has mostly been driven by actors clearing land to support
64 the expanded production of agricultural commodities (Curtis et al., 2018; Pendrill et al.,
65 2022). In addition to the land use change driven by the conversion of forest areas for
66 commercial purposes, significant forest degradation and value loss has also been driven by
67 changing climatic factors such as drought, wildfires, and pests – factors which may have
68 synergistic effects that worsen one another as further land conversion and climate change
69 progress (Réjou-Méchain et al., 2021). On the current trajectory, one third of total forest
70 value may be lost by 2050 (Kappen et al., 2020).

71

72 In response to these unsustainable deforestation and degradation trends, prominent global
73 coalitions are working to mainstream recognition of the value of forests and halt their
74 destruction. The Bonn Challenge, for example, aims to restore 350 million hectares of
75 degraded and deforested landscapes by 2030. The New York Declaration of Forests sets
76 out ten goals contributing to global forest conservation, such as livelihood support to local
77 communities and improved forest governance. In addition, countries have voluntarily
78 committed to restore over 230 million hectares of degraded forests in the next decade
79 through Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the United Nations Framework
80 Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Fagan et al., 2020). More recently, at the
81 UNFCCC Conference of Parties in Glasgow (COP26), 141 countries representing over 90
82 percent of the world's forests committed to collectively halt and reverse forest loss and land
83 degradation. These initiatives highlight awareness of multiple benefits of forests beyond
84 carbon storage and sequestration¹, and that countries agree that curbing climate change
85 must simultaneously promote the rights of indigenous peoples, gender equality, health,
86 human rights, and more. This is also reflected through the Sustainable Development Goals
87 (SDGs), which include multiple targets that forests contribute to such as addressing hunger,
88 reducing poverty, and providing freshwater.

89

90 Despite the growing international recognition of the relevance of forest co-benefits for
91 society, they remain undervalued, underpriced, and underfunded. The nature funding gap is
92 estimated to be between US\$598 and US\$824 billion, meaning we need to be spending at
93 least that much more to reverse decline in biodiversity (Deutz et al., 2020). As Costanza et
94 al. (1997) put it, "because ecosystem services are not fully 'captured' in commercial markets
95 or adequately quantified in terms comparable with economic services and manufactured
96 capital, they are often given too little weight in policy decisions". Few widely accepted or
97 implemented frameworks exist to account for them in policies and markets. The *social cost*
98 *of carbon* (SCC), for example, omits economic impacts related to the loss of ecosystem
99 services, essentially valuing them at zero (Druckenmiller, 2022). Meaningfully estimating the
100 value of forest benefits can be technically and politically challenging; there are different ways
101 to measure value, and forests hold different value for different actors (e.g., Cáceres et al.,
102 2015). Moreover, attempting to articulate the value of forests in monetary terms can be
103 contentious. Some critics, for example, argue that economic valuation is a distraction from a
104 warranted focus on ending destructive and exploitative projects (Unmüßig, 2016).

105

106 In addition, the literature to date on the co-benefits of forest-based climate change mitigation
107 activities is limited. Most such studies examine the services provided by certain forestry
108 activities or forest types (Calvo-Rodriguez et al., 2017; Himes-Cornell et al., 2018). A global
109 meta-analysis by Mengist & Soromessa (2019) found that co-benefits research has focused
110 on provisioning, regulating and cultural ecosystem services, such as timber production,
111 water supply, carbon sequestration, and recreation. Yet, while ecosystem services are
112 essential to supporting biodiversity, research on ecosystem services does not typically
113 include biodiversity indicators.

¹ The importance of forests to carbon storage and sequestration has also been formalized by the UNFCCC, first through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol and later through the mechanism for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) under the Paris Agreement. The former made afforestation and reforestation projects in developing countries eligible for financing from developed countries because of their mitigation services, while the latter incentivizes countries to protect their forests through readiness and results-based payment programs.

114 Nevertheless, understanding the co-benefits of avoided deforestation is an essential
115 foundation for mobilizing new investment to protect forests and the enormous value they
116 provide (Sarira et al., 2022). They also provide an entry point for leveraging collateral
117 investment (i.e., investment from secondary sources) for forests. Economic or social benefits
118 shape the motivation of profit-seeking investors, public institutions, philanthropists, and
119 impact investors to contribute funds in forest protection. The emerging carbon market, for
120 example, highlights carbon as a primary benefit, yet buyers are increasingly focused on
121 performance metrics beyond carbon (Goldstein, 2016). Similarly, climate finance donors,
122 such as the Green Climate Fund, are increasingly requiring proposals to identify co-benefits.
123 Clearer frameworks to discuss and define this valuation of forest co-benefits, and the link to
124 social and economic outcomes, could help ease the adoption of the policies and market
125 practices needed to bring these co-benefits the attention (social and financial) they warrant.
126

127 To advance this need, we explore how we can better reflect and communicate the full value
128 of forest benefits in policy discussions. Specifically, we (1) bring together different concepts
129 and provide a theoretical framework for analysis of the potential economic damages due to
130 the loss of both forest carbon benefits and co-benefits, which we call the *social cost of*
131 *deforestation (SCD)*; (2) explore valuation of forest co-benefits in practice, focusing on high-
132 level assessments and carbon crediting frameworks; and (3) propose some concrete ways
133 forward that can be useful for policymakers and governments. Though we draw primarily
134 from examples and our experiences working on tropical forests, the insights and lessons
135 from this paper are also relevant to valuing other types of forests and ecosystems.
136

137 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

138 Defining forest co-benefits

139 We understand forest co-benefits as all the benefits to society provided by forest-based
140 climate change mitigation. In most cases, these are additional benefits occurring in climate-
141 positive activities where a primary aim is carbon sequestration. We take carbon and climate
142 policies as our starting point because the implementation of forest activities are still occurring
143 within a strongly carbon-centric framework, such as the REDD+ mechanism² and voluntary
144 carbon market. At the same time, the emergence of co-benefits has occurred in the context
145 of increased consensus around the need for forest carbon offsets to also provide other social
146 and environmental benefits. Even among REDD+ stakeholders, however, there are three
147 competing normative perspectives: carbon-centric (the primary aim should be carbon
148 sequestration); carbon-centric with an emphasis on safeguards (the current approach
149 adopted by the UNFCCC); and co-benefits-centric (which puts both carbon and co-benefits
150 as primary goals of REDD+) (Vijge et al., 2016).
151

152 While there is no universally accepted classification of forest co-benefits, several scholars
153 and institutions propose typologies of what these benefits could entail in the context of
154 forest-based climate change mitigation. Katerere et al. (2015) propose three broad
155 categories: social (improved economic livelihoods), environmental (ecosystem services
156 provision), and governance (improved forest governance) benefits. Similarly, Lee et al.
157 (2011) posit that REDD+ co-benefits can be classified according to five goals: conserving

² Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries, and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries

158 biodiversity, protecting ecosystem services, community benefits, economic benefits, and
159 adaptation needs. While these two typologies overlap in terms of environmental benefits,
160 Lee et al. (2011) include adaptation needs and differentiate between economic and
161 community benefits. They refer to economic benefit as the potential income stream that
162 countries receive for REDD+ implementation, while community benefit refers to the direct
163 livelihood improvement of local people and communities on the ground, where projects are
164 implemented. Another third typology emphasizes the institutional benefits of REDD+,
165 specifically the indirect improvement of governance (land tenure, law enforcement) and
166 institutional capacities (Luttrell et al., 2018).

167

168 **Relating valuation to monetization**

169 Values refer to “norms that allow judging, individually or collectively, if something is good,
170 beautiful, true, useful, moral, etc.” (Salles, 2011). Valuation, the process of assigning value
171 to goods, requires the development of frameworks for understanding how a potentially
172 valued good should be judged against these norms. Valuation frameworks can serve as
173 tools for rational decision making related to resource use, conservation, and the opportunity
174 costs of one action over another. Economic valuation, and the decision frameworks that flow
175 from it, usually have an anthropocentric focus – they are ultimately based on the impacts of
176 choices and actions on human well-being, defined across various measures and scales.

177

178 Economic valuation is closely tied to monetization, as economic values are often expressed
179 in monetary terms. Monetization is the estimation or conversion of the value of a good *into*
180 *terms of units of currency* (Silvertown, 2015). Distinct from setting prices on a good, the
181 process of monetization can allow the inclusion of benefits and costs in decision making
182 frameworks that otherwise might be unable to capture them for consideration and
183 comparison, especially frameworks considering large financial flows. Monetization can make
184 intangible benefits more concrete for the purposes of such comparisons– in a sense, making
185 the invisible visible on a balance sheet. But monetization, and the extent to which a
186 monetized estimate reflects the ‘true’ total value of a good, is deeply shaped both by the
187 depth of our understanding of the relevant benefits of the good in question, and by our ability
188 to meaningfully convert these benefit streams to financial terms, through a diverse range of
189 possible approaches.

190

191 Cost-benefit analysis has been increasingly adopted as a common framework for valuation
192 over the last decades. Today, it often serves as a major basis for decision making within
193 corporate finance and public policy, across many sectors and geographies. The popularity of
194 this method may be rooted in its apparent simplicity – adding up estimates of a list of costs
195 and benefits and then comparing. But particularly in the context of environmental decision
196 and policy, where the benefits of a good or action may be intangible and distant compared to
197 immediate near-term financial costs incurred by a decision-making actor, this framework can
198 pose serious challenges. Effective cost-benefit analysis depends on comparable units of
199 valuation; monetization is potentially useful to help bring otherwise intangible benefits into
200 comparable units of a common currency. However, if the full value of certain environmental
201 goods are not yet even fully understood and articulated, they cannot be adequately
202 quantified for comparison, much less meaningfully and fairly monetized. In line with this
203 concern, critics of the monetization of nature argue that doing so also reduces its intrinsic
204 value (that is, perceived value in its own right) down to the insufficient monetary value.

205
206 Finally, as true market prices stem from an equilibrium between supply and demand, they
207 are rooted in both a collective ‘willingness to pay’ for a scarce good – and in a collective
208 *ability* to pay, which may or may not fully align with need or desire. Willingness to pay is also
209 shaped by the information that a potential buyer has about a good, and what of that is salient
210 to their decision-making processes. For example, an actor weighing a business decision to
211 clear a forest and sell the timber may not be aware of the benefits of this forest to her local
212 water supply and quality; she might value the forest more highly if she knew this– or, more
213 importantly, if she understood the implications of the loss of these benefits for the future of
214 her downstream aquaculture operation.

215 216 **Understanding the *social cost of deforestation***

217 Carbon benefits, by default, currently play the role of the primary benefit justifying the core
218 investment in forest preservation. Additional benefits justify the collateral investment, such
219 as the positive return of transition from extensive to intensive cattle ranching (Golub et al.,
220 2021). Over time, however, the value of individual benefits, or components, that constitute
221 the total value of a forest may change. This can happen through various processes of land-
222 use change, the most drastic being deforestation. As such, we introduce a new framework
223 for capturing this change in value, which we call the *social cost of deforestation*.

224
225 Since the publication of a seminal article by Pearce (1990), economists have used the
226 concept of the *total economic value (TEV)* of the forest to map use and non-use value
227 derived from a range of forest co-benefits. We argue that there is rationale for a leap from
228 just the economic value of forests to the social value of forests, which we understand as the
229 *social cost of deforestation* as it represents the potential economic damage stemming from
230 the loss of both carbon and other co-benefits (**Figure 1**). Similar to the *social cost of carbon*,
231 which is defined as “the monetary value of the damage done by emitting one more ton of
232 carbon at some point of time” (Pearce, 2003), the *SCD* reflects the net present value of the
233 lost benefits from deforested land (damage). The concept of the *SCD*, however, is broader
234 than the *SCC*. The *SCC* usually considers global damage, without concern for where the
235 additional ton of CO₂ was emitted. With the *SCD*, on the contrary, location plays an
236 essential role in defining the value, which is a combination of global and site-specific losses.

237
238 Specifically, the *SCD* can be presented as a sum of three major components:

- 239
- 240 ● Monetized benefits;
 - 241 ● monetizable benefits; and
 - 242 ● non-monetizable benefits that have a social value quantifiable in economic indicators
- 243


244 **Monetized benefits** reflect current revenue from ecosystem services provided by forests.
245 These benefits create an economic barrier to deforestation that competes with other land
246 use options that require deforestation. Examples of revenue streams created as long as the
247 forest is preserved include sales of nontimber products, revenues from initial REDD+
248 intervention, philanthropic contributions, and conservation support from the government.

249 **Monetizable benefits** (but not yet monetized) include future revenues from trading high
250 quality, high integrity emission reductions – which are likely to incentivize conservation and

251 produce co-benefits on a large scale – for a fair market price. These include external
 252 benefits such as soil erosion prevention and watershed protection. These benefits could be
 253 monetized as a result of specific interventions targeting some or all of them.

254 **Non-monetizable benefits** may still have economic value but not be monetizable in terms
 255 of increased revenue or output. For example, health risk reduction, say, avoided mortality
 256 has a high economic value calculated as the value of statistical life but a positive economic
 257 impact on output due to preventing loss of labor is negligibly small relative to the economic
 258 value of social benefits of avoided mortality. Some benefits are intangible but should be
 259 taken into account even if their economic value cannot be calculated.

260 **Figure 1. Expanding the TEV concept with the SCD concept.** *Total economic value* separates most forest value into
 261 use or non-use values (adapted from Pearce et al., 2020). The *social cost of deforestation* provides a bridge to
 262 conceptualize the changes in forest value, and importantly, future potential value.



263 Because of the irreversibility of deforestation, taking a forward-looking analysis of benefits is
 264 essential. This allows for two complementary processes to be accounted for:


- 265 ● Change in time value of different components of *TEV* or in more general terms *SCD*;
- 266 ● Catchup of *TEV* with *SCD*

267 The literature on the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) can help us to understand how
 268 these processes occur. The hypothesis of the EKC argues that an increase in per capita
 269 income first coincides with an increase in pollution but when per capita consumption reaches
 270 a certain critical level, pollution becomes a decreasing in per capita consumption function
 271 (Dinda, 2004). In other words, it postulates an inverted-U-shaped pollution dynamic – in our
 272 case the utility of deforestation – as a function of per capita income. As such, the changes in
 273 the value of *SCD* components are driven by transformations in the utility function of
 274 deforestation as the economic context evolves and transformations in the global and local

275 ecosystems occur (**Figure 2**). For example, transformation of the utility function may lead to
 276 an increase in the relative value of the forest as a whole and changes in the relative value of
 277 individual components of ecosystem services. Different transformations take place on the
 278 global, national, and local levels.

279 As such, understanding local dimensions of co-benefits are essential to predict the reliability
 280 of local institutions in enforcing of forest conservation (including avoided deforestation,
 281 reforestation, and prevention of forest degradation) and realistic assessment of local
 282 participation. For example, when communities have a strong understanding of the multiple
 283 benefits of forests, and policy aligns with their values, they are more likely to comply with
 284 conservation policy and keep politicians accountable for enforcement of conservation
 285 programs and policies (Nurrochmat et al., 2019). This also suggests that region-specific
 286 SCD may be a good communication tool to encourage local authorities to contribute to forest
 287 preservation, as locally tailored SCDs can help regional institutions and decision makers
 288 understand the value of protecting their own forests.

289
 290 **Figure 2. Illustrating SCD alongside the Environmental Kuznets curve framework.** As deforestation increases
 291 (A), the *social cost of deforestation* increases because each unit of damage from deforestation comes at a greater
 292 cost to society (B); once deforestation peaks the SCD remains high because the value of forests has been
 293 recognized by society. As the gap between the TEV and SCD narrows, hidden value of forests becomes visible.
 294 The red lines illustrate potential trajectories for the SCD, though the possibilities are not limited to these three
 295 options; in reality, the trajectory of the SCD will depend on contextual conditions.




296 Furthermore, only a fraction of SCD values is monetizable or monetized, but this fraction
 297 changes over time. The social value of carbon changes over time, as does the value of
 298 biodiversity and other ecosystem services. The remaining values represent the non-
 299 monetizable benefits, in which case it may not always be necessary to assign a specific
 300 value to the benefit, but there could still be a cost associated with it. For example, with

301 irreversible changes to the forest system such as the extinction of a species, the cost could
 302 be infinity if that species plays an important role in maintaining ecosystem functioning.

303 In addition, the share of different components (non-monetized benefits, monetizable
 304 benefits, and monetized benefits) also changes. For instance, the proportion of
 305 intangible/non-monetizable goods included in *SCD* is currently high. Due to changes in
 306 preferences and in response to increased scarcity of forested land, the *SCD* is likely to
 307 increase in time: advances in climate policy and building institutions to protect forests will
 308 likely increase the share of monetizable benefits; advances in the economic valuation of
 309 ecosystem services and increased demand for ecosystem services will likely also increase
 310 the share of monetizable benefits, revealing the “hidden value” of the forest. This
 311 transformation of *SCD* and changing share of its components are illustrated in **Figure 3**.

312 **Figure 3. Transformation of *SCD* components.** (A) Shifts in measurement create opportunity for forest value to be
 313 recognized as monetizable, some of which becomes monetized, or made visible in financial terms; (B) over time, overall
 314 *SCD* can change (e.g., increase) as can the individual components.



315 In the future, some previously unknown benefits of forests may also be revealed. This could
316 happen if a new function or social value of forests is discovered. In this case, the process of
317 transformation of *SCD* and its components might be more complicated. For example,
318 imagine you have a national forest with protected upstream water resources. The total value
319 of the resources in the forest are much larger than any economic benefit. As soon as
320 authorities collect a fee from visitors, a fraction of the monetizable benefits becomes
321 monetized. If authorities introduce water charges downstream, then another fraction of
322 monetizable benefits is monetized. If, however, there is currently no monetization all
323 external benefits are in theory, monetizable. As more benefits are socially recognized or
324 discovered, the opportunities for monetization become endless, but this does not mean
325 monetization will occur. In this sense, it is also possible that the gap between total value
326 and monetizable value may never fully close and the non-monetized benefits remain; we
327 elaborate on strategies for capturing the non-monetizable value in the **Outlook** section.
328

329 VALUING FOREST CO-BENEFITS IN PRACTICE

330 Representation in high-level assessments

331 Over the last two decades at least four leading scientific initiatives have attempted to
332 compile and consolidate scientific knowledge on how ecosystems, forests, and biodiversity
333 are valued globally (**Table 1**). Under the umbrella of the United Nations, the Millennium
334 Ecosystem Assessment (MEA), the Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB), and
335 the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services
336 (IPBES) all outline ways to estimate the value of nature. Similarly, the World Bank has been
337 conducting annual assessments of natural capital accounting with their Changing Wealth of
338 Nations (CWON) reports. These assessments are supported by international platforms for
339 science and policy, which have potential to influence the development and trajectory of
340 forest conservation investment globally.

341
342 **Table 1. High-level assessments reviewed**
343 [see end of manuscript]
344

345 The MEA was the first to highlight the challenges of estimating credible values for many
346 forest services (MEA, 2005). The TEEB dedicates a full chapter to forests and proposes
347 PES and REDD+ as measures to correct failures of markets to value biodiversity and
348 ecosystems (TEEB, 2008). The CWON measures natural and human capital in the form of
349 assets (World Bank, 2021). Similar to the MEA, critical services such as biodiversity habitat
350 and species protection, cultural and/or existence values, or landscape aesthetics are not
351 included in the CWON due to the lack of proper market equivalent values consistent with the
352 wealth accounting methodologies. Carbon retention is another key ecosystem service not
353 considered. Differently to MEA, IPBES recently introduced the concept of *nature's*
354 *contribution to people*, which was developed to embrace a fuller and more symmetric
355 consideration of diverse stakeholders and worldviews, and a richer evidence base for action
356 (Díaz et al., 2018). The reporting system for *nature's contributions to people* has a gradient
357 of complementary and overlapping approaches, ranging from a generalizing to a context-
358 specific perspective.

359
360 These above-mentioned assessments have been picked up extensively by the mass media,
361 reaching a broad audience and shaping global narratives. Furthermore, they have served as

362 the theoretical foundation of environmental damage proceedings brought before the
363 International Court of Justice (ICJ). In February 2018, for example, after Nicaragua
364 excavated a channel on disputed territory, the ICJ ordered it to compensate Costa Rica for
365 damage to its rainforests and protected wetlands (I.C.J., 2018). The case is significant for at
366 least two reasons: it was the first time the ICJ decided on an environmental damage case;
367 and the ICJ's decision explicitly recognizes that the environmental damage includes
368 ecosystem services. The ICJ accepted Costa Rica's claim that biological diversity and
369 ecosystem services merit valuation, and partially grounded its decision by referring to the
370 different categories of ecosystem services developed in the MEA. In short, there was a
371 science base that supported its claims. In the immediate future, as climate and
372 environmental litigation continues to develop, the need for better mechanisms to value
373 nature will become increasingly prevalent. With climate litigation cases growing exponentially
374 in recent years, this will become increasingly important (Setzer & Higham, 2022).

375

376 **Inclusion in crediting standards**

377 A study on the emerging market of forest co-benefits found that they are often the major
378 reason why buyers engage in forest carbon markets in the first place (Goldstein, 2016).
379 These positive co-benefits — in particular biodiversity and community impacts — are even of
380 equal or greater importance to some buyers of emissions reductions than the carbon credits
381 themselves. It remains, however, difficult to track the impacts of carbon projects beyond
382 carbon as these are not often included in assessments. This is in part because individual
383 impacts are very context-specific, and measuring them could mean additional transaction
384 costs for projects. Yet, there are also potential negative impacts, or trade-offs, that may
385 occur in the implementation of carbon projects. As such, to evaluate forest co-benefits in
386 carbon standards we must consider on the one hand, what criteria and indicators are in
387 place to ensure positive co-benefits are accounted for in project design; and on the other
388 hand, what environmental and social safeguards are in place to minimize adverse outcomes.

389

390 We use the forest carbon standards reported on by Ecosystem Marketplace, an initiative
391 publishing information and reports on financing for ecosystem services, as our starting point.
392 Specifically, we review four of the most commonly used standards for certifying forest
393 projects in the voluntary carbon market (VCM): the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS), the
394 Gold Standard, Plan Vivo, and the Climate Action Reserve (CAR). We also look at the newer
395 The REDD+ Environmental Excellence Standard (TREES), which aims to provide a market
396 pathway for high integrity emission reduction and removals credits coming from countries
397 and sub-national jurisdictions.

398

399 Currently, most activity related to forest credits takes place in the voluntary carbon market as
400 most compliance markets, such as the European Union Emission Trading System, have
401 limited inclusion or exclude forests from their crediting schemes (Maguire et al., 2021).
402 Lessons from the VCM, however, may still be applicable to compliance markets as they are
403 expected to grow in the near future. This is indicated by recent negotiations under Article 6
404 of the Paris Agreement, which deemed REDD+ credits eligible for international transactions
405 as long as they comply with the rules and meet quality criteria (Streck, 2021). The
406 emergence of new compliance mechanisms, like the United Nation's Carbon Offsetting and
407 Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSA) program, also hints at this as they
408 plan to accept forestry and land-use offset standards (Maguire et al., 2021).

409

410 We find that the carbon standards we evaluated vary in their scope and coverage of forest
411 activities (see **Table 2; Supplemental Information**). Additionally, some capture co-benefits
412 directly within their standard requirements, while others ensure environmental and social
413 safeguards by partnering with complementary standards to certify co-benefits beyond
414 carbon. The latter seems to be the case with the larger standards, like VCS and Gold
415 Standard, while direct integration in the standard framework occurs with Plan Vivo and
416 TREES, which both have a more specific mandate. Plan Vivo prioritizes smallholder
417 projects, which are mostly land-based, while TREES focuses specifically on REDD+
418 transactions, with the aim to unlock long-term financing for forest protection and restoration.

419

420 **Table 2. Forest carbon standards reviewed**

421 [see end of manuscript]

422

423 However, there is still room for improvement. Forest projects remain a relatively small share
424 of carbon credits, meaning the amount of certified co-benefits is likely even smaller.
425 Furthermore, while some standards represent individual co-benefits well, few are
426 comprehensive in their coverage of co-benefits. A report on carbon market standards for
427 REDD+ projects came to similar conclusions. No one standard scored at least 80% across
428 all areas of their evaluation, which included 'climate integrity', 'biodiversity conservation' and
429 'human and community rights, stakeholder participation and sustainable community
430 development' categories (Schmidt & Gerber, 2016).

431

432 **OUTLOOK: EXAMPLES AND OPPORTUNITIES**

433 As discussed above, there is increasing global recognition of multiple streams of benefits
434 from forest-based mitigation activities. But emerging valuation approaches in practice
435 currently are diverse, and many assessments still do not consider the full potential of forests.
436 Examining methods and frameworks currently in use for valuing co-benefits can help identify
437 new opportunities to mobilize increasing funds for forest preservation. To this end, we
438 discuss some practical ideas that could be extended to capture a more complete valuation of
439 forests in decision-making.

440

441 In the **Theoretical Framework** section, we defined total forest value as consisting of
442 monetized benefits, potentially monetizable benefits, and non-monetizable benefits. Here,
443 we first consider tools for shifting potentially monetizable benefits towards monetized,
444 primarily by extending existing markets and finance tools. We then discuss non-market
445 opportunities to leverage previously uncaptured value from non-monetizable benefits. Some
446 of these approaches have implications for both market- and non-market-based mobilization
447 of funds; we discuss the example of jurisdictional REDD+ to illustrate this (see **Box 2**).

448

449 **Market-based strategies for capturing monetizable benefits**

450 There is currently a high proportion of unmonetized benefits in the *SCD*. We discuss market-
451 based strategies for leveraging these benefits that build on the success of carbon markets
452 and of existing financing mechanisms for ecosystem services. We also consider
453 opportunities for driving new investment using a *green alpha* methodology, a novel approach
454 for estimating the hidden benefits of avoided deforestation and assessment of these benefits
455 in monetary terms.

456

457 ***Further embed valuation of co-benefits into existing carbon markets***

458 Interest in “high-quality” carbon credits is rising, particularly given increasing public scrutiny
459 and media conversations highlighting the potential dangers of insufficiently rigorous forest
460 carbon crediting frameworks (see, for example, discussion in Nasi & Pham 2023). This
461 demand is already beginning to translate into increased prices, and therefore increased
462 potential for financial support of well-implemented REDD+ activities credited under high
463 integrity frameworks; for example, a 2015 study found that voluntary credit purchasers,
464 particularly nonprofit or government buyers, were willing to pay a significant price premium
465 for Gold Standard credits, used within the study as a proxy for quality (Parnphumeesup and
466 Kerr, 2015).

467

468 A 2016 study suggests that credits generated under standards with a co-benefits emphasis
469 were more likely to be successfully sold to a buyer (Lee et al., 2016). Within the voluntary
470 carbon market, this protection and enhancement of forest co-benefits within crediting
471 standards aligns with reported motivations for some classes of credit purchasers (Goldstein
472 2015). As illustrated in **Table 2**, many major forest-based emissions crediting standards
473 already incorporate requirements for environmental and social safeguards that protect and
474 maintain key forest co-benefits. Other standards are beginning to elevate formal recognition
475 of these co-benefits; for example, Architecture for REDD+ Transactions (ART) has recently
476 launched a process to develop a formal co-benefits certification option as part of its
477 jurisdiction-scale TREES crediting framework (ART, 2023b).

478

479 This emerging trend could be further leveraged by promoting standards and rules privileging
480 high-quality forest carbon standards – including those that protect and enhance forest co-
481 benefits—within compliance markets and common voluntary emissions target-setting
482 frameworks. In alignment with this, third-party efforts to define credit quality increasingly
483 highlight the inclusion of environmental and social safeguards that align with the
484 enhancement of ecosystem services and other co-benefits, particularly as they relate to
485 impacts on indigenous and local stakeholders. Recent and ongoing nonprofit efforts to define
486 carbon credit quality include the Tropical Forest Crediting Integrity Guide (COICA et al.,
487 2023), the Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market (ICVCM) Core Carbon
488 Principles guidance and Assessment Framework development process (ICVCM 2023), and
489 the Carbon Credit Quality Initiative (CCQI). Credit rating efforts from for-profit companies are
490 also emerging as the value of traded credits continues to rise. To the extent co-benefits are
491 included, whether explicitly or implicitly, such emerging frameworks for assessing the quality
492 of forest-based credits generally associate credit generation efforts that enhance aspects of
493 forest co-benefits with preferential ratings. Expanding the association of these co-benefits
494 with definitions of higher carbon credit quality may in turn open the door for higher future
495 prices and increasing flows of forest finance.

496

497 ***Target nature-related financial risks to leverage emerging finance mechanisms***

498 Recent innovations in finance to support ecosystem services are beginning to unlock funds
499 to incentivize forest conservation specifically on the basis of their monetized co-benefits.
500 One illustrative example of relevant innovation in this space is the Cloud Forest Blue Energy
501 Mechanism (CFBEM) (Narvaez et al., 2017). The CFBEM relies on the ability to model and
502 monetize particular co-benefits of forest conservation and restoration, enabling beneficiaries

503 to “pay for success” of direct financial benefits provided by the conservation and
504 enhancement of forests. Specifically, a major co-benefit of restored and protected cloud
505 forests is the prevention soil erosion; these benefits are in turn monetized based on their
506 impact to the operating costs of hydropower companies (i.e., reductions in expenses related
507 to reservoir sediment dredging, due to enhanced conservation and restoration within the
508 watershed). These reduced hydropower operating costs also translate into cost savings for
509 hydropower consumers, who may also be charged some of the cost difference to support
510 forest protection and restoration.

511 Mechanisms like this example rely on the ability to meaningfully quantify and translate
512 ecosystem services into estimates of tangible costs avoided by the financing actors (in this
513 case, estimates of the dredging costs avoided by participating hydropower companies).
514 Expanding such mechanisms to other as-yet-unmonetized co-benefits may require work to
515 articulate, quantify, and monetize the impacts of these benefits through the lens of “nature-
516 based solutions” – that is, with a focus on specific financial damages and risks that the
517 conservation of forests can help avoid. In line with this, efforts such as the Taskforce for
518 Nature-related Financial Disclosures (TNFD) may prove particularly valuable; this UN-
519 supported working group is developing a framework to drive increased reporting and
520 disclosure of nature-related financial risks and dependencies by corporations and other
521 actors (TNFD, 2022). Such reporting would likely expand the awareness and salience of
522 tangible impacts of forest conservation on business operations – setting the stage for
523 increasing monetization and subsequent financing to reduce the risks created by forest loss.
524 Similarly, the insurance industry is also considering opportunities in the nature-based
525 solutions space, with forest insurance currently being the most advanced (Swiss Re Institute,
526 2021; Li, 2022).

527 ***Adopt a green alpha paradigm***

528 While some of the tangible value that forests provide can be identified and quantified as
529 discussed above, some value provided by forests have likely not yet been identified.
530 Moreover, as discussed in the **Theoretical Framework** section, the total economic value per
531 unit of forest is expected to increase over time, especially as additional forested land is lost.
532 A methodology to estimate the scale of these yet-unrecognized and/or future value
533 components could help incorporate them into market-based transactions and decision
534 making. The *green alpha* methodology provides an estimation of the value of preserving
535 forests for future use – that is, an option value enabling investors to account for this likely
536 future appreciation of the total value of forests (see **Box 1**). Based on the *climate alpha*
537 methodology explored in Golub et al., 2022, it provides a potential pathway for actors to
538 monetize and internalize yet-unrecognized ecosystem-linked externalities of deforestation.
539 This framework could also help investors assess the monetizable co-benefits of avoided
540 deforestation to calculate future return on investment.

541

542 -----

543 **Box 1. The *green alpha* methodology**

544

545 The *green alpha* methodology is an extension of what is presented in Golub et al. (2022) as the *climate alpha*
546 valuation paradigm. Climate alpha reflects the extent to which the current market value of emissions reductions
547 do not reflect the future appreciation (and monetization) of these assets. *Green alpha* describes a similar
548 mismatch between current and future valuations of forest assets, and the potential gain from investing in forests
549 prior to this future materialization of value. By nature, both *climate alpha* and *green alpha* formation are rooted in

550 uncertainty regarding future climate policy. For example, strong signals of near-future strengthening of global
551 climate policy would likely result in rapid appreciation of assets that help meet climate mitigation needs (and
552 thereby comply with newly strengthened policies), including assets based on REDD+ activities. As current global
553 emissions and deforestation trends are known to be at odds with global decarbonization goals, such shifts in
554 climate policy could potentially occur at any moment. But the sequence of any policy course corrections, their
555 timing, and the actual resulting increase of the shadow price of carbon are unknown. This suggests that
556 investment in assets that will gain value in the face of future climate policy shifts could be lucrative, but the
557 specific scale and timing of this expected jump in value can only be described using (at best) a probability
558 distribution or event tree. By creating a long position on high-integrity REDD+ backed emission reductions, an
559 investor could be positively exposed to future known risk premia up to the probability distribution. The economic
560 value of this risk premium could be calculated as an option value, as detailed in Golub et al., 2022. The same
561 logic applied to calculating *climate alpha* potentially applies to calculating *green alpha*, in that appreciation of
562 main and co-benefits and resulting financial valuation could be estimated as a probability distribution.

563 -----

564

565 **Non-market-based opportunities for capturing additional co-benefits**

566 Beyond the sphere of market-based mechanisms described above, a range of opportunities
567 exist to leverage the co-benefits of forests to drive both investment and decision making in
568 support of increased conservation. The diversity of forest co-benefits, and their potential
569 impacts on human health, wealth, and welfare, create opportunities for alignment with
570 unconventional sectors and stakeholders. Below, we discuss pathways to raise the effective
571 valuation and visibility of forest co-benefits on policy agendas, focusing on the agricultural
572 commodity and health sectors as two illustrative examples.

573 ***Promotion of deforestation due diligence within agricultural supply chains***

574 While new means of measuring the tangible impacts of forest conversion to business
575 operations may drive new financing mechanisms, emerging policies could create additional
576 incentives for these companies to support forest protection. For example, compliance rules
577 regarding deforestation in agricultural commodity supply chains are emerging in major export
578 markets such as the European Union (EU Commission, 2022). Such rules could drive new
579 corporate interest in supporting financial or programmatic mechanisms that protect forests
580 from agricultural conversion. The Science Based Targets initiative (SBTi) also recently
581 issued a new methodology to align forest, land, and agriculture related goals with their
582 framework (SBTi, 2022). Setting targets under this initiative is becoming an increasingly
583 common standard against which corporate actors are judged; moreover, policy signals
584 suggest that setting standards under SBTi may eventually be functionally or literally
585 mandated for some sectors or countries in the future (for example, US federal regulatory
586 rulemaking initiated in late 2022, which proposes to require climate goals aligned with the
587 SBTi framework for US federal suppliers and contractors above a certain contract size
588 (OFCSO 2023).

589 ***Alignment of forest conservation goals with holistic health policy***

590 As links between the natural world and human health outcomes become increasingly clear,
591 policy-relevant definition of “health” are expanding. Strategically designed initiatives can help
592 create willingness to avoid deforestation and indirectly compensate for opportunity loss of
593 avoided deforestation by highlighting potential health implications of forests and their co-
594 benefits. For example, the BC Parks Foundation in Canada recently launched PaRx, an
595 initiative that aims to promote both conservation and healthcare savings by partnering with
596 healthcare providers to issue “nature prescriptions” (PaRx, 2023). The prescriptions reduce

597 barriers to nature access for patients (e.g., providing passes to parks), while highlighting the
598 many health improvements linked to time spent in nature. Similarly, Japan has a long history
599 of forest therapy programs, with evidence supporting positive economic and physical and
600 mental health outcomes (Zhang et al., 2022). In addition to being supported by widespread
601 local policy, these programs are embedded in the national health framework via the Ministry
602 of Health, Labor, & Welfare and Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries.

603

604 At a broader level, the Health in All Policies (HiAP) concept, endorsed by United Nations
605 Member States, provides an example of a framework for incorporating health implications
606 into policies and decision making across all sectors – including, by extension, health impacts
607 related to forest co-benefits. HiAP “takes into account the health implications of decisions,
608 seeks synergies, and avoids harmful health impacts in order to improve population health
609 and health equity” (WHO, 2013), and has been used at local, state, and national levels to
610 enable the insertion of health priorities into policy actions at each. While such a framework
611 provides a potential opportunity to advance forest conservation on the basis of its links to
612 human health, it could also serve as a model for driving attention to a topic with implications
613 that touch a diversity of sectors. For example, efforts might be made to promote a “Forests in
614 All Policies” model, requiring the specific consideration of ecosystem impacts in a broader
615 suite of policy decisions.

616

617

618 **Box 2. Mobilizing funds for forests: The case for jurisdictional REDD+**

619

620 Jurisdictional REDD+ is a good example of collateral investment. Backed by public funds, institution building that
621 allows a jurisdiction to scale up REDD+ supply in the future is probably one of the best ways to leverage private
622 investment in emission reductions. The jurisdiction may use its resources to leverage this by directing REDD+
623 activities in areas where forest preservation, reforestation or prevention of forest degradation generates higher
624 co-benefits (monetizable and non-monetizable). Accurate calculation of benefits at each implementation stage
625 and by each stakeholder is necessary for cross leveraging and maximizing REDD+ benefits.

626

627 For practical reasons, there is still a need to draw the line between primary and collateral benefits. For example,
628 corporations seeking high-quality high, integrity emission reductions (ERs) for compliance or as a part of
629 voluntary actions could be willing to invest in JREDD+ to scale up ERs production. Understanding of co-benefits
630 and EKC-like mechanisms and its monetization at the local level creates confidence in the permanence of ERs.
631 This is because at some point, the direct incentives attributed to JREDD+ investment for ERs production will
632 weaken and fade. When this happens, collateral benefits will play a major motivational role. For example, by
633 estimating the co-benefits and assessing the chances that the local community and the host country will continue
634 forest preservation in the future motivated by local benefits, the JREDD+ investor (e.g. corporation or investment
635 fund) is better able to evaluate the risk of reversal.

636

637

638 **CONCLUSION**

639 The gaps between total value, monetized value, and market prices create room for
640 enormous losses of economic value (and total value) in the context of forest conservation,
641 particularly when forests are viewed solely through the lens of their potential carbon benefits.
642 Estimates of the *social cost of carbon* are generally far higher than current global market
643 prices of carbon, including those prices used in the context of carbon-based forest finance. If
644 forest conservation is priced on the basis of its carbon impacts alone, the enormous value
645 provided by forests through ecosystem services is excluded from decision frameworks that
646 estimate value based on this pricing – which itself already elides the true social benefits of

647 the carbon value itself. As such, under a carbon-only framework, the monetization of forest
648 conservation programs, projects, and initiatives vastly undervalues the true benefits of these
649 forests to society.

650

651 A global transition toward green growth will ultimately result in a reevaluation of the value of
652 the environment and natural resources. To avoid future stranded assets and minimize
653 regrets about the irreversible loss of ecosystem services, forward-looking analysis of
654 ecosystem value is essential. The future increase in the value of ecosystem services relative
655 to conventional consumer goods must be considered, as well as other transformations
656 potentially triggered by the shift toward green growth.

657

658 Moreover, to attract collateral investment, such forward-looking analysis must detect
659 monetized and monetizable value in the investment, expressed in monetary terms. It is not
660 just enough to compute environmental indicators: Investors are interested in what their
661 potential monetary return may be on invested capital, as well as the risks. It remains difficult
662 to measure, monitor, and verify many co-benefits. But the *social cost of deforestation*
663 framework captures not only various components of economic and social benefits of forests,
664 but also helps describe synergies and nonlinear responses of unit value to scale.
665 Subsequently, the adoption of methodologies like green alpha valuation may help fill the gap
666 in our near-term ability to monetize this complete value.

667

668 Using these approaches, we can assign financial weight to forest co-benefits, allowing them
669 to be compared more easily to other goods. The goal is not to advance financial gain, but to
670 elevate and leverage an expanded suite of forest co-benefits, across decision making
671 frameworks and policy discussions that might otherwise eclipse what can't be represented in
672 currency. A vital outcome of monetizing of forest co-benefits and connecting them to
673 financial markets is the potential to unlock investment needed to support forest-positive
674 actions. This can lay the groundwork for the collection of immediately available bridge
675 funding resources from across sectors to complement REDD+ support, on the pathway
676 toward a more all-encompassing framework and larger funding streams for health,
677 biodiversity, and so on. The practical examples we discussed are already pushing the
678 needle in the right direction.

679

680 Finally, we need to stop unsustainable nature-exploitative activities and capture true value of
681 forests in decision making – not one or the other, but both. We must transform our value
682 systems (held values) in societies, and policy and markets are an important political signal to
683 catalyze this shift. However, even if a focus on co-benefits helps to accelerate investment in
684 avoided deforestation, it still may be not enough to secure ambitious environmental targets.
685 As such, the expansion of monetizable solutions must be reinforced by strengthening
686 regulations. Future research should explore additional governance considerations and
687 conditions for supporting increasing efforts to recognize forest co-benefits.

688

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696

697 **Author contributions**

698 SF, AG, and CD conceived of the study. IS, AG, CG, CD, and SF conceptualized the
699 research. AG led the development of the theoretical framework. IS led the development and
700 writing of the manuscript. All co-authors contributed to the development of the theoretical
701 framework and manuscript, including writing and editing. IS led the reviewing and editing
702 process. SF supervised the project.

703

704 **Conflict of interest**

705 The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal
706 relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

708 Table 1. High-level assessments reviewed

Initiative/ Assessment	Last report	Relevance	Insights/method for valuation
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA)	2005	First international initiative measuring the value of ecosystem services for human wellbeing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Argues Market approaches can only be used to estimate the value of few forest services, mostly the ones related to provisioning services and that enter formal markets • Acknowledges that there is no consistent methodology, and usually insufficient and incompatible information, to estimate credible values for many other forest services, such as habitats for biodiversity • Acknowledges that researchers have successfully applied monetary methods to “non-market” and often “non-traditional” services • Identifies <i>Total Economic Value</i> as the most widely used framework for identifying and categorizing forest benefits
The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB)	2008	Highlighted growing costs of biodiversity loss and ecosystem degradation; a motive of the study was to establish an objective global standard basis for natural capital accounting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proposed a three-step method for valuing poorly or undervalued ecosystem services <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identify and assess the full range of co-benefits to be valued (recognize them) • Estimate and demonstrate their value • Capture value and seek solutions to overcome under-valuation, using economically informed policy instruments
Changing Wealth of Nations (CWON)/ The System of Environmental Economic Accounting (SEEA)	2021	CWON uses the SEEA, which is the official international framework for natural capital accounting; SEEA Ecosystem Accounting (EA) is the first internationally agreed-upon statistical framework for ecosystem accounting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A framework of five core accounts make up the building blocks of the SEEA EA: Ecosystem extent, ecosystem condition, ecosystem services, ecosystem monetary asset and thematic accounts • Accounts constitute an accounting system which presents a comprehensive and coherent view of ecosystems • To value forests, the CWON report uses international forest statistics from FAO and its metric is U\$S
Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES)	2022	Introduced the concept of <i>nature's contribution to people</i> , which embraces a wide range of descriptions of human-nature interactions, including the concept of ecosystem services and other descriptions, ranging from utilitarian to relational	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Offers a systematic assessment of over 50 different methods found in the literature for valuing nature • Groups methods into four non-disciplinary ‘method families’ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nature-based valuation gathers, measures or analyses information about the properties of nature and its contributions to people • Statement-based valuation directly asks people to express their values • Behavior-based valuation identifies how people value nature by observing their behavior and practices • Integrated valuation brings together various types of values assessed with different information sources

710 **Table 2. Forest carbon standards reviewed**

Carbon standard*	Year established	Categories of forest use certified (as described by the carbon standard)	Co-benefit standards	Co-benefit considerations	Registered forest projects†	Forest projects as % of total†
Verified Carbon Standard (VCS)	2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Afforestation Reforestation and revegetation (ARR) Improved forest management (IFM) Reduced emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Climate, Community, and Biodiversity (CCB) program 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Must demonstrate contribution to at least three SDGs Can certify with additional standards (e.g., CCB, SDVista) to recognize non-greenhouse gas (GHG) social and environmental benefits 	225	11% (out of 2022 projects)
Gold Standard	2003 (Clean Development Mechanism) 2006 (voluntary market)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Afforestation / Reforestation (A/R) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fairtrade Climate Standard 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can certify additional SDG impacts (e.g., via SustainCERT) such as renewable energy certificate labels; water benefit certificates; gender equality impacts; improved health outcomes; black carbon reductions 	32	2% (out of 1984 projects)
Plan Vivo	1994	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Protection (Reducing deforestation and/or degradation of forests) Restoration (tree planting, assisted natural regeneration, and management to restore ecological function) Improved management (Improving forest management practices to increase carbon stocks and/or reduce greenhouse gas emissions) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No complementary co-benefit standard 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires "positive impacts on local livelihoods and ecosystems" Requires a benefit-sharing mechanism (at least 60% of carbon sale must go to community or smallholder) Requires setting of a livelihood and ecosystem baseline Requires the provision of long-term livelihoods benefits that are additional to the sale of certificate of employment in projects 	25	89% (out of 28 projects)
Climate Action Reserve (CAR)	2001 (began as California Climate Action Registry)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved forest management Avoided conversion (forestland to non-forest use) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No complementary co-benefit standard 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not reported on 	115	61% (out of 188 projects)
The REDD+ Environmental Excellence Standard (TREES)	2021	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All Reduced emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD+) activities except removals from forests remaining forest 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Announced a co-benefit certification under development in 2023 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sets its environmental, social, and governance requirements in line with the Cancún Safeguards 	17	100% (out of 17 projects)

711 * Information on standards sourced from documents on organization websites (ART, 2023c; CAR, 2023; Gold Standard, 2023;
 712 Plan Vivo, 2023; Verra, 2023)
 713 † Data for VCS, Gold Standard, Plan Vivo, and CAR was accessed January 11, 2023 on the Voluntary Carbon Market
 714 Dashboard (Climate Focus, 2023); data for TREES was accessed February 13, 2023 on the Architecture for REDD+
 715 Transactions registry (ART, 2023a)
 716

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